Your SSL client is
Improvable.
Check out the sections below for information about the SSL/TLS client you used to render this page.
Yeah, we really mean "TLS", not "SSL".
Version
Good Your client is using TLS 1.3, the most modern version of the encryption protocol. It gives you access to the fastest, most secure encryption possible on the web.
Post-Quantum Key Agreement
Improvable Your client does not support post-quantum key agreement. Without that support, your traffic could be stored by adversaries today and decrypted once sufficiently powerful quantum computers become available. The expected timeline for cryptographically-relevant quantum computers has shifted earlier, and support for post-quantum cryptography is necessary to defend against "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks. As of June 14th, 2026 at 10 AM PT, clients without post-quantum key agreement are marked as Improvable. On December 14th, 2026 at 10 AM PT, they will be marked as Bad.
Ephemeral Key Support
Good Ephemeral keys are used in some of the cipher suites your client supports. This means your client may be used to provide forward secrecy if the server supports it. This greatly increases your protection against snoopers, including global passive adversaries who scoop up large amounts of encrypted traffic and store them until their attacks (or their computers) improve.
Session Ticket Support
Good Session tickets are supported in your client. Services you use will be able to scale out their TLS connections more easily with this feature.
TLS Compression
Good Your TLS client does not attempt to compress the settings that encrypt your connection, avoiding information leaks from the CRIME attack.
Insecure Cipher Suites
Good Your client doesn't use any cipher suites that are known to be insecure.
BEAST Vulnerability
Good Your client is not vulnerable to the BEAST attack because it's using a TLS protocol newer than TLS 1.0. The BEAST attack is only possible against clients using TLS 1.0 or earlier using Cipher-Block Chaining cipher suites that do not implement the 1/n-1 record splitting mitigation.
Given Cipher Suites
The cipher suites your client said it supports, in the order it sent them, are:
- TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
- TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
Given Named Groups
The named groups your client said it supports, in the order it sent them, are:
- x25519
- secp256r1
- secp384r1
Given Signature Algorithms
The signature algorithms your client said it supports, in the order it sent them, are:
- ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
- ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
- ed25519
- rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
- rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
- rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
- rsa_pkcs1_sha512
- rsa_pkcs1_sha384
- rsa_pkcs1_sha256